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TAX ASPECTS OF INNOVATIVE
REAL ESTATE FINANCING
Jack M. Feder
I. THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF LENDING
"T'was a poor loan at best, but God the interest."
Paul L. Dunbar, The Debt
Persistent high inflation rates and general price instability have forced
a rethinking in basic lending practices. Most lenders are unwilling to make
the traditional long-term, fixed-rate mortgage. Instead, a new theme has come
to dominate permanent lending: equity participation.
Equity participation means that in consideration of lending money the
lender receives not only fixed interest but some portion of the earnings of the
property. Equity participation protects the lender against the erosion of the
value of a fixed interest rate position in inflationary times. Through equity
participation devices the lender participates in the increased nominal dollar
earnings of a property as well as any increase in the nominal dollar value of
the property. Use of such methods in lieu of short-term loans with exorbitant
fixed rates may also be advantageous to the borrower. The borrower is pro-
tected against the inability to service debt in later years if a new interest rate
establishes a level of debt service in excess of cash generated by the property.
Under these new financing methods the brunt of the interest cost to the
borrower is borne when the property is disposed of.
II. THE MANY FORMS OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION
In general, equity participation involves a sharing of income and
refinancing proceeds by the lender and the borrower. There is an almost
endless variety of forms but some examples are:
1. A pure equity position: The lender becomes a full partner
with the borrower and in exchange for a capital contribution is given a right
to a percentage of partnership items plus, in most cases, a fixed annual return
equal to a percentage of the lender's capital contribution. What results in
simple terms is a joint venture between the lender and the borrower.
2. A pure loan: The lender makes no capital contribution
and, in form, is not a partner. As consideration for the use of money, the
lender receives two forms of interest, (a) fixed interest and (b) contingent
interest measured as a percentage of the net profit, or some form of gross
revenues, from the operation and disposition of the property and from any
refinancing of the loan.
, For an excellent discussion of the multiplicity ot forms used for this type of
financing, see the publication by the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
American Bar Association, Financing Real Estate During the Inflationary 1980's
(1981); see also Freeman, Interest, Contingent Interest and Original Issue Discount:
Some Emerging Tax Strategies in Corporate and Real Estate Finance, 59 Taxes 942,
955-962 (1981).
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3. A convertible pure loan: This form is essentially the same
as #2 except that, at some point, the lender has a right to convert all or part
of its loan into a partnership interest. Prior to conversion, the lender may
participate in profits or revenues. A right to convert is usually designed to
assure the lender that it will participate in any appreciation in the value of
the property in the event that no disposition occurs before the loan matures.
If there is no right to convert, the loan usually requires an appraisal as of
maturity and a final interest payment based upon a percentage of appreciation
in the value of the property during the loan term.
4. A convertible equity interest: In this case the lender ob-
tains a small "common" partnership interest in exchange for a nominal capital
contribution. In addition, for the bulk of its contribution the lender receives
a "preferred" partnership interest with priority rights on liquidation and a
fixed preferred annual return. The bulk of losses, profits and credits are
allocated to the "common" interests most of which are held by the borrower.
The lender has a right to convert to a common partnership interest with
increased participation in profits and losses.
5. A combination equity interest and pure loan: The lender
may make a fixed rate mortgage loan and simultaneously obtain a partnership
interest at the very outset.
6. A ground lease: The lender buys the land and leases it to
the developer. The lender then makes a leasehold mortgage loan to the de-
veloper, the proceeds of which are used to construct the project. Ground rent
is contingent, and is measured as a percentage of gross revenues or net profit.
The leasehold mortgage loan may be in any of the forms discussed above.
As one can imagine, the federal income tax consequences
vary considerably from form to form. Some of the issues are obvious and are
answered by the Internal Revenue Code itself: for example, how a lender will
be taxed if he is a partner. Other issues are more subtle - including char-
acterization of the relationship of the lender and borrower for tax purposes,
and the consequences of granting and exercising rights of conversion - and
there is little meaningful guidance to assist in their resolution.
III. TAX ASPECTS OF THE FORMS OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION
A. GENERAL
The basic issue is how to classify the lender-borrower relationship
for tax purposes. The tax benefits to be derived by the borrower from the
transaction very much depend upon the nature of the lender's investment for
tax purposes. The primary tax benefit of owning real estate is derived from
depreciation deductions, which depend upon the borrower's basis in the prop-
erty. If the lender is solely a creditor, the borrower can include the amount
of the loan in basis for purposes of computing depreciation. 2 If the lender is
2 See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Com-
missioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949), acq. 1949 2 C.B.1; Mayerson v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq., 1969-1 C.B. 21.
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(or is held to be) solely a partner in a joint venture with the borrower, the
partnership will be able to take the same amount of depreciation deduction
as would the borrowers if there were no partnership, but the borrower probably
will not be able to utilize his share of the losses currently. This is so because
a partner may not deduct his share of partnership losses that exceed his basis
in his partnership interest. I That basis includes the amount of cash and the
adjusted basis of property contributed by the partner as well as the partner's
share of partnership liabilities including mortgage liabilities. 4 In almost every
case the borrower's share of losses will far exceed his basis attributable solely
to cash and property contributions. Consequently, if no mortgage loan is
made, or if the loan transaction is recharacterized as a partnership, the bor-
rower's basis in his partnership interest probably will not be enough to allow
the borrower to fully utilize his share of the losses of the partnership. Trans-
actions are almost always leveraged to some extent in order to provide the
borrower with basis, even in a straight forward joint venture with a lender.
There are other significant tax reasons for attempting to classify
the lender's investment as a debt. For certain investors, it may be desirable
to receive interest payments rather than distributions taxable under subchapter
K. Foreign investors, for example, are subject to tax on partnership net income
from a U.S. trade or business and on capital gains from the sale of U.S. real
estate, but may not be subject to tax, or will be subject to a reduced rate of
tax, on "interest," payments, including payments of interest from sales pro-
ceeds. I Tax exempt lenders seeking to avoid the tax on unrelated trade or
business income often do not wish to have the relationship classified as a
partnership. 6 It is due to these benefits, that many transactions are structured
as loans with contingent"interest."
Once the relationship is classified, many other issues will be
resolved by resorting to traditional and fairly well-developed lines of authority.
Thus, in form #1 (the pure equity position) the tax consequences will be
governed by the rules of Subchapter K of the Code. The same rules will apply
to any interest in the venture held by the lender as a partner, or to one deemed
to be, although couched in terms of a lender's position.7
If the lender is a partner, tax benefits such as depreciation and
investment tax credits must be shared in accordance with the partnership
agreement, subject to the usual limitation that the allocations must have
substantial economic effect. 1 Payments to the lender in its capacity as partner
will not be deductible unless the payments are required irrespective of the
income of the partnership. 9 Thus, payments to a partner that are contingent
upon net or gross income revenues may not be deductible and generally will
be taxed as distributions from the partnership. 10 Payments to the lender made
Section 704(d), I.R.C. of 1954.
Sections 722, 752, I.R.C. of 1954.
See Sections 871(b), 875, 882, 897(c) (1) (A) (ii), I.R.C. of 1954; U.S.-Neth-
erlands Income Tax Convention, Article VIII.
S6 See Sections 511-514, I.R.C. of 1954.
"See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
aSee Section 704.
9 See Sections 707(a), (c); Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977).10 See Pratt v. Commissioner, supra., Note 9. In Rev. Rul. 81-300, 1981-51 I.R.B.
11 and Rev. Rul. 81-301, 1981-51 I.R.B. 12 the Service indicated that under certain
circumstances payments to a partner geared to gross income may qualify as a deductible
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without regard to income and in consideration of the use of capital are de-
ductible. I IThus, even if the lender is a partner, payments of an annual return
on the lender's investment are deductible. Moreover, if the lender is a partner
but is deemed to make a loan to the partnership other than in its capacity as
a partner, payments of contingent as well as fixed interest arguably would be
deductible. 12
If the lender is held to be solely a creditor, payments of fixed
and contingent interest will be deductible subject to the usual rules governing
interest payments. 13 The borrower will retain all tax benefits associated with
owning the real estate and will be entitled to include the amount of the debt
in its basis for purposes of computing depreciation. 14
If the lender is held to be a creditor, the substantial interest
payments at the end of the loan term, or upon disposition or refinancing of
the property, create a significant tax benefit for the borrower if the gain from
dispositions is taxable as a long term capital gain. For example, if the gain
from the sale is $100x and the lender receives 50% of profits, the tax con-
sequences are remarkable. In order to compute the tax on the capital gain the
borrower deducts $60x, leaving taxable income of $40x. 15 The borrower pays
$50x to the lender and deducts it, producing an ordinary tax loss from the
transaction of $10x. What occurs is an instantaneous conversion benefit by
allowing an ordinary deduction that is simultaneously recaptured at the bor-
rower's capital gains rate. The foregoing benefit is even greater if the payment
occurs as a result of a refinancing, which is not a taxable event, 16 or of a
tax-free conversion. 17
B. Classifying the Relationship for Tax Purposes
The preceding discussion shows the important benefits to be
derived from careful structuring of the transaction. Difficulties concerning
the effectiveness of structuring the form of the transaction stem from the
somewhat anachronistic system for taxing lending arrangements. Although
contingent interest is not new to this era, the regimen for taxing lending
transactions was conceived when loans bore a fixed rate of interest and con-
tingent interest may have been a cause for suspicion. The general commercial
lending setting has undergone a basic metamorphosis, and the courts may
find themselves trying to fit the hexagonal peg of the new lending arrange-
ments into a square hole provided by existing authorities.
The issue most frequently raised when there is significant equity
participation by the lender is whether the lender will be treated for income
tax purposes as a partner.
guaranteed payment within the meaning of Section 707(c) or as payments to a partner
other than in its- capacity as a partner, within the meaning of Section 707(a). The
reasoning of these rulings could apply to payments to the lender.
"1 See Section 707(c), I.R.C. of 1954.
12 See Section 707(a), I.R.C. of 1954.
'B See, e.g., Sections 163(a), 163(d), 189, 265, 461(g), I.R.C. of 1954.
1' See cases cited at note 2 supra.
,1 See Section 1202, I.R.C. of 1954.
6 See Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
'7 See Section 1033, I.R.C. of 1954.
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Whether the lender is a partner or a creditor is a factual issue
that is simply a particular version of the ubiquitous debt vs. equity question.
The issue is whether the parties intended to create a debt relationship or that
special form of equity relationship that is a partnership. 11 To determine that
intent from objective criteria, courts rely upon the touchstones of equity
investor status derived from cases involving investments in corporations '9 as
well as the following elements that are prerequisites unique to the partnership
entity:
a. Sharing of losses and profits as proprietors
b. Contribution of capital or services by the partners
c. Written or other expressions of intention to form a
partnership; and
d. Control over the business enterprise by the partners. 20
How will the typical lender equity participation fare under these
tests? The answer is at best uncertain and will, of course, depend upon the
facts of each case.
Assume for discussion purposes that the loan is nonrecourse and
that the lender, who is not legally a partner of the borrower, will receive a
significant (say, 50 percent) interest in net profits from operations, disposition
and refinancing. The transaction in this example stands up well under the
traditional indicia of a loan derived from corporate cases. There is (1) a fixed
maturity date reasonably close in time; (2) a demonstrable intent that principal
be repaid before any return to equity investors or before payments to other
creditors; (3) significant fixed interest payable without regard to income; and
(4) a loan to collateral value ratio that is well within commercially acceptable
parameters. 23 These facts distinguish the loan in our example from those
cases where a nonrecourse loan to a partnership has been classified as equity
because repayment of principal was conditioned upon profits or because the
value of the security for the loan was speculative. 22
The question is simple: despite the presence of the usual prereq-
uisites of a loan, will the fact that a taxpayer pays a percentage of net profits
as compensation for a loan create a partnership with the lender? There are
more cases dealing with this question than one might expect, and the general
answer derived from those cases is that profit participation alone does not
create a partnership between borrower and lender. 23 There are also several
18 See, e.g., Culbertson v. Commissioner, 337 U.S. 733 (1943); Dyer v. Com-
missioner, 211 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1954); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d
724 (8th Cir. 1963).
19 See Hambuechen v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 77 (1964); Rouse v. Commissioner,
23 T.C.M. 1823 (1964); Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972 - 2 C.B. 394; Gibson Products Co.
v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
20 See, e.g., Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
21 See Hambuechen v. Commissioner, supra, note 20.
22See Gibson Products Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 19; Rev. Rul. 72-350,
supra note 19; Hartmann v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. 1020 (1954).
2 See Astoria Marine Construction Company v. Commissioner 4 T.C.M. 278 (1943)(a case involving a recourse loan); Mayer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. 391 (1954);
Arthur Venneri Company v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 337 (Ct.Cl. 1965); Commis-
sioner v. Williams, 256 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1958); cf. Duly v. Commissioner, 41
T.C.M. 1521 (1981) and Ewing v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 216 (1953) (in both cases
the court did not find a partnership despite a profit sharing arrangement).
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cases involving employment agreements under which an employee received
a percentage of profits as part of compensation. These, too, generally hold
that the form of compensation does not convert the employment relationship
into a partnership. 24 Indeed, in some cases the Internal Revenue Service itself
has argued that a transaction involving a net profit sharing arrangement was
a loan, but the court at the behest of the taxpayer found a joint venture. 25
There are also cases under other sections of the Code which sanction such
contingent interest payments, the most notable and frequently cited of which
is Kena, Inc., v. Commissioner. 26
These precedents indicate a pronounced reluctance to characterize
a profit sharing arrangement as a partnership in the absence of other indicia
of partnership. Indeed, the authors of one leading treatise in the area of
partnership taxation have concluded that paying a share of net profits as interest
will not create a partnership between borrower and lender. 27 Are such other
indicia of partnership present in our example?
There is clearly a sharing of net profits. Because the loan is
nonrecourse, it could be argued that there is also a limited form of loss sharing.
The lender is the party bearing the risk of loss attributable to depreciation in
the value of the mortgaged property below the partnership's equity. Although
the lender's exposure is limited, limited sharing of loss is consistent with the
existence of a limited partnership.
The lender ostensibly contributes no capital. As noted above its
investment has most of the traditional hallmarks of debt, and it is clear that
an advance of funds that is held to be a loan is not a contribution to capital. 28
What if the court finds that there is a loan but that the fixed interest rate is
below the market rate and that the right to equity participation serves as
additional interest? Isn't the bargain element of the loan arguably "property"
in exchange for which the lender receives its profit participation? An analogy
can be drawn from the corporate area. First, a bargain sale to a shareholder
has always been held to be a constructive distribution of property to the
shareholders in an amount equal to the value of the bargain element. 29 Second,
the treatment of corporate instruments under Section 385 provides additional
24 See Friednash v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1954); Sugg v. Hopkins,
11 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1926); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, supra note 18; Rev.
Rul. 75-43, 1975-1 C.B. 383.
25 See Gurtman v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 475 (1975).
26 Kena, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941); (court holds that interest
paid as a percentage of profit is interest); See Murphy v. Commissioner, 48 A.F.T.R.
2d, 81-5589 and Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160, 162 (dissenting opinion)
in which the holding in Kena is cited with approval. See also Dorzbach v. Collison,
195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952) and Erwin De Reitzes Marienwart v. Commissioner,
21 T.C. 846 (1954) in which the courts held that interest payments which were
measured as a percentage of profits were deductible either as interest or as the "lend-
er's" share of partnership profits. The courts did not choose which characterization
applied.
27 See 1 McKee, Nelson, Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners,
3-21 (1st Ed. 1977) (hereinafter referred to as "McKee").
21 See, e.g., Arthur Venneri Company v. Commissioner supra note 23; Holladay
v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Carriage Square Development
Corporation v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119 (1977) (holding that borrowed money is
not "capital" for purpose of Section 704(e), I.R.C. of 1954).29 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. Section 1.301-10).
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insight. Under certain circumstances, if a shareholder makes a loan to its
corporation for a below-market interest rate, the lender is deemed to make a
capital contribution of the excess of the consideration it paid over the value
of the instrument. 30 The amount of the loan principal is constructively reduced
under the regulations so that the fixed interest payment will generate a fair
market return, and the amount of the reduction, i.e., the "bargain element"
is treated as a contribution to capital. These precedents support an argument
that the lender in our example has made a constructive capital contribution
to the venture.
The nonrecourse nature of the loan is also relevant to whether
there has been a capital contribution. A nonrecourse loan more closely re-
sembles a contribution of capital put at the risk of the profitability of the
enterprise than a recourse loan does. 31 Courts, however, generally refuse to
attach much significance to the nonrecourse nature of a loan in real estate
transactions, assuming that the collateral is of sufficient value. 32 Thus, the
nonrecourse nature of the loan probably should not be very significant with
respect to this element or the preceding element (loss sharing). Since non-
recourse loans are the normal commercial practice in the industry, it is not
really indicative of an intent to share loss as proprietors.
Another element of a partnership is control over the enterprise
by the partners. Even in a limited partnership the limited partners usually
have some control over selection of general partners and major dispositions
of partnership property. If, as in our example, the lender has a traditional
note and mortgage and the unadorned right to contingent interest, the lender
has no equity type controls. As a practical matter, however, such a case is
unlikely. If the lender's return is dependent upon net profit, the lender may
want some controls over management, major expenditures, dispositions, and
the like. In order to protect the value of its interest in profits the lender will
often have a right to convert to a partnership interest. If the right to convert
is immediate or may be exercised before any major partnership action, the
lender will, in substance, have equity like control over the property. The
presence of these controls, the sharing of net profits and the arguable presence
of other elements, provide a defensible basis for a decision that the lender is
a partner. It is important to note that the cases repeatedly hold that no single
element is indispensible to a finding that a partnership exists. 33
The Service could make several other arguments. For example,
it is arguable that so substantial a participation in net profits is inconsistent
with a debtor-creditor relationship as it is traditionally defined, particularly
where nonrecourse debt is involved. Historically, a lender exchanged a higher
economic return for the greater security of a lender's position and in so doing
accepted a fixed interest rate. Today, the lender wants the equity holder's
return as well as the security of a lender. Where the primary value of the
- Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.385-6(c)(1).
31 See Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200; cf. Rev. Rul. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438(no ruling will be issued as to partnership status if a nonrecourse lender obtains an
equity participation).
32 Compare Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980) and Dunlap v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 104 (1980) with Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045
(9th Cir. 1977).
33 See, e.g., Beck Chemical Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840 (1957).
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instrument is attributable to equity type returns, it is arguable that the entire
nature of the investment changes from a debt to equity despite the absence
of the typical risks of an equity investor. 34
An analogy might be drawn from the sale leaseback cases. In
certain cases the putative owner-lessor has been held to be entitled to all of
the depreciation from property despite an uncertain and severely limited return
on investment and despite the fact that the lessee is in the position to exploit
almost all meaningful appreciation in the value of the property. 3- Where the
lender has the right to share in as much as 50% of all economic benefits to
be derived from owning the property (more if the annual preferred return is
counted), the Service could argue that the lender's stake in the equity of the
property is far greater than that of the lessor in the sale leaseback cases.
The consequences of recharacterizing the entire lending trans-
action as a partnership are so severe that a court might search for a middle
ground, particularly since the loan has many of the characteristics of debt.
There are at least two plausible alternatives:
1. Treat only the equity participation as an interest in a
partnership.
A court might treat the equity participation as an income
interest in a partnership transferred to the lender as consideration for making
the loan. The lender would be deemed to make a bonafide loan of the principal
other than in its capacity as a partner. 36 The fixed interest would be deemed
to be "interest" on the loan within the meaning of Section 163. 37 Such a
decision could be based upon the presence of a capital contribution of the
bargain element of the loan together with any equity type controls obtained
by the lender. Although tax benefits would be shared by the lender, the
borrower would be able to increase his basis in his partnership interest by his
share of the liability and would be entitled to his share of the interest deductions
for the fixed interest payments. 38
This approach is supported by Farley Realty Corporation
v. Commissioner.' In that case a lender, who was not otherwise related to the
borrower, made a loan to a corporation for a fixed interest rate (15%) and
contingent interest equal to 50% of appreciation in the mortgaged property
over the term of the loan. The corporation paid the lender an amount to satisfy
its contingent interest obligation. The court held that the right to contingent
Cf. proposed Treas. Reg. Section 1.385-5 (where most of the value of an in-
strument issued by a corporation is attributable to contingent interest, the instrument
will be treated as stock; for a discussion of similar views see Stone, Debt-Equity
Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corporation and its Shareholders, 42 Tulane
L. Rev. 251, 274 (1968); Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate
Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 Tax L. Rev. 369, 437-440 (1971)
(hereinafter referred to as Plumb); Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States, 301 F.
Supp. 689 (D. Wisc. 1969).
35 See, e.g., Frank Lyons Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); American
Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
36 See Section 707(a), I.R.C. of 1954.
37 Under Section 707(a) interest payments made to a partner, other than in its capacity
as partner, are treated as if paid to an unrelated party. See Pratt v. Commissioner,
550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977); Treas. Reg. Section 1.707-1(a).
38 See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
39 279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960).
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interest constituted an equity interest in the corporation separable from the
debt and disallowed the interest deduction by the corporation.
2. Treat the equity participation as an assignment of income.
An alternative argument would be to treat the assignment
of an equity participation as a negotiated, commercial assignment of income
for arm's length consideration (the consideration being the agreement to make
the loan). This argument has more appeal than the preceding alternative
because a naked net profit interest is more like an assignment of income than
a true partnership interest. If this theory were applied to our example, the
borrower would retain the tax benefits. The annual allocation of taxable
income to the lender could, have the same effect as a deduction of interest
(but would not be subject to limitations on interest deductions). On the other
hand, the conversion benefit attributable to substantial interest payments upon
disposition of the property would not be available. 40
Generally, a taxpayer may not make an effective, gratuitous
assignment of future income, but such an assignment for arm's length con-
sideration in a commercial setting apparently is allowable. 4, At least one
court has allowed such an assignment of income despite retention of the
income producing property (stock) by the owner, 42and another court indicated
that under the right circumstances such an assignment could be successful. 41
On the other hand, the Tax Court has opined strongly against such a position;
albeit arguably under distinguishable circumstances. "
The transfer of the equity participation is also analogous
to a reserved income interest in mineral rights; a reserved income interest is
a right retained by the transferor of mineral rights to an amount of income
to be derived from the property by the transferee. In such cases some courts
have held that the owner of the reserved interest, not the transferee of the
property, is taxable on the reserved income. 45
-" There are many difficult issues raised by such a theory. For example, when will
interest income be reported by the lender and in what amount; what effect will the
payments each year have on the borrower's taxable income when net income exceeds
taxable income; how will the payments in the year of disposition be taxed? Presumably,
the payment in the year of disposition would simply reduce the capital gain of the
borrower so that there would be no contemporaneous conversion benefit. The diffi-
culties stem from the absence of solid precedent dealing with an assignment of income
without an accompanying assignment of the underlying property.
41 See Lyon and Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by
the P.G. Lake Case, 17 Tax L. Rev. 293, 298-300; Plumb supra note 34 at 442 n.
400; Dychala, Anticipating Sales of Future Income - When Includible in Income, 58
Taxes 608 (1978).
42Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
43 See Mapco, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1107 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
- See Martin v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 1255 (1977), aff'd. per curiam 469 F.2d
1406 (5th Cir. 1972); Hydrometal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. 1260 (1972),
aff'd per curiam 485 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 4"16 U.S. 938 (1974).
Compare Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S.
551 (1933); Ashlock v. (Commissioner, 18 T.C. 405 (1952); with Bryant v. Com-
missioner, 46 T.C. 848 (1966); Hibler v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 663 (1966); Vermont
Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1040 (1953). For a discussion of the potential
application of this doctrine to the real estate area see McGuire, Tax Aspects of Income
Reservation in Real Estate Transactions, 8 J. of Real Estate Tax 213 (1981).
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These precedents indicate that the income interest in our
example arguably represents a form of equity in the property so that the
lender, not the borrower, would be taxable directly on the transferred income.
It is far more likely that a court would opt for a more
conventional recharacterization of the transaction than adopt the assignment
of income approach. In addition to problems with existing case law, such an
approach has no effect on the allocation of tax benefits, which may be the
major concern of the Service. Also, the Service is not likely to resort to this
theory; by obtaining a favorable result using this theory, the Service would
unleash the commercial assignment of income theory to creative planning by
taxpayers.
C. Issues Raised by Corporate Borrowers.
The result may be different if the borrower is a corporation.
Newly proposed regulations provide that if, on the date of issue, the value
of the "straight debt payments" of an instrument is less than 50% of the fair
market value of the instrument, the instrument will be treated as stock. 46 The
value of straight debt payments is essentially the sum of the present value of
the rights to fixed payments of interest and principal and the value of the
rights to contingent payments based upon the least amount that must be paid
(and on the latest possible date of such payment) under the pertinent contin-
gencies. 47 In order to determine the value of the payments a reasonable
discount rate must be applied to the future payments. 41
If the instrument is deemed to be stock, the consequences are
very adverse. Although the borrower retains the tax benefits of ownership,
payments of fixed or contingent interest would not be deductible since they
would be deemed corporate distributions taxable under Section 301 et. seq.
The corporate borrower would be taxed on the full amount of gains from
disposition and would not be entitled to any deduction or offset for payments
made to the lender from the sales proceeds. Compare those consequences
with the less adverse consequences of the lender being a partner.
Can an instrument covered by the regulations nevertheless be
deemed to create a joint venture? The regulations state that once an instrument
is classified as either debt or stock the classification is effective for all purposes
of the Code. 49 Since the regulations specifically address this type of instru-
ment, a strong argument can be made that neither the Service nor a taxpayer
should be able to impose a different characterization on the relationship.
Nevertheless where (1) there are indicia of a partnership, e.g., a right to
convert to a partnership, or equity-like controls over a specific property, and
(2) the use of the funds is limited to a specific venture of the corporation,
one could argue that the partnership regime should be imposed upon the
relationship and that Section 385 does not apply. As a technical matter, the
argument would be that the note is not an "instrument" but a partnership
agreement so that it would not be subject to Section 385. 50
,6Prop. Treas. Reg. Section 1.385-5(a).
47Prop. Treas. Reg. Section 1.385-5(d).
"Prop. Treas. Reg. Section 1.385-5(d)(4).
"Prop. Treas. Reg. Section 1.385-4(c)(1).
50 The proposed regulations only apply to an "instrument," which is defined as an
interest in a corporation that is treated as indebtedness under state law. Thus, the
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It might be possible to avoid the adverse consequences of ap-
plying Section 385 to a loan to a corporation by using a loan to a partnership
composed of a shareholder and his corporation or to a partnership of a cor-
poration and its subsidiary. If the partnership form is respected, the conse-
quences of recharacterization would not involve loss of interest deductions
and the borrower would be entitled to reduce its share of gains by the gains
properly allocable to the lender-partner.
D. The Effect of Sharing Gross Income.
Many lending arrangements provide for a sharing of gross rev-
enues by the lender. Using this type of contingent interest should preclude
any argument that there is a partnership with the lender since the primary
element, a sharing of net profit, is absent. If the definition of gross income
is overly creative, so that gross income approximates net profit, the conclusion
could be different. Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Subchapter K to
such an arrangement, the assignment of income argument could still apply.
In addition, interest that is contingent on gross income is not a "straight debt
payment" for purposes of the Section 385 regulations. Consequently, the
presence of such interest could cause an instrument issued by a corporation
to be classified as stock.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GRANTING AND EXERCISING RIGHTS OF
CONVERSION TO A LENDER.
As discussed above, for a variety of reasons, a lender will frequently
be granted a right to convert all or a part of its interest into equity. The grant
and exercise of the right to convert will have significant tax consequences to
the lender, and the exercise of the right will have significant consequences
for the borrower as well as the lender.
A. Consequences to the Lender: the Grant of the Right.
If a lender agrees to make a loan in exchange for fixed and
contingent interest plus a right to convert to equity, it seems clear that the
conversion right is "property" which is paid to the lender as additional interest
(or as an additional cost of the loan) at the time that the lender receives the
right. 51 It would appear, then, that under the very broad definition of interest,
the lender must include the value of such right, if any, as interest income at
the time that the right is received. The value of the right at such time would
answer to this question may well depend upon the way that the state law would treat
the agreement between the corporation and its putative "creditor." See Prop. Treas.
Reg. Section 1.385-3(b) and (c). See also S & M Plumbing v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 702 (1971) and Maxwell v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 1356 (1970) (cases
involving joint ventures between corporations and shareholders).
5, Cf. Duncan Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 266 (1979) (held: the
value of a right to buy stock of the borrower at a discount, given to a lender, in the
future is an additional cost of obtaining a loan). See Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488
(1940).
-2 See U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1961); Peninsula Properties, 47 B.T.A. 84(1941).
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depend upon a comparison of the rights of the lender under the note and as
a partner. Thus, if either as lender or partner the lender will have a 50%
profits interest, the extra value of the conversion right may not be substantial.
If, however, the lender receives only fixed interest until conversion occurs,
and the conversion will enable it to obtain a greater equity participation, the
right to convert might have significant value.
Since the borrower is transferring property in satisfaction of a
legal obligation to pay interest, the borrower will realize gain equal to the
value of the property transferred - the right to convert. 52 Since the borrower
has no basis in the right to convert, the gain recognized will equal the amount
realized. 53 Although the right is transferred as an interest payment, no current
deduction would be allowable because the interest relates to the entire loan
term. Instead, the interest must be amortized over the loan term. 5
The foregoing analysis, however is far from certain. The right
to convert is comparable to an option to acquire property with an exercise
price equal to the unpaid principal of the loan. In the compensation area it
is not at all clear that the date that an option to acquire property is granted
is the date that the employee is required to include the value of the option in
income. The case law (and now, pertinent regulations derived from the case
law) indicate that the appropriate time may be the date the option is exer-
cised. 55 The rule derived from the cases is that the value of the option will
be includible in income when the option is granted only if the value on that
date is "readily ascertainable." Such value is deemed to be "readily ascer-
tainable" only if the right is fully exercisable and transferable; it must not
be subject to inhibiting conditions that would affect its value; and the property
to be acquired must not be subject to restrictions or conditions. 56 It appears
that the grant of the right to convert to the lender might not meet these
conditions. If this analogous line of cases is applied to the lender's right to
convert, the time for recognition of the income would be deferred until the
right to convert is exercised, and the income would be measured by the spread
between the exercise price and the value at that time. 57
B. The Exercise of the Right to Convert.
For purposes of discussion assume the following facts: The bor-
rower ("B") owns a building subject to a $500 debt to L, with a basis of
51 An unanswered question is when the borrower must report the income. The
general rule is that payments for an option are not reported until the option is either
exercised or expires. See, e.g., Hunter v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 954 (1944). If the
option is exercised the amount received is capital; if the option is not exercised, the
amount realized is treated as ordinary income. The right to convert is analogous to
an option. Accordingly, it could be argued that the gain should be deferred under the
rules applicable to options. But what effect, if any, will the deferral have on any
interest deduction allowed to the borrower? See the text accompanying note 54 infra.
Since the interest will be paid or accrued when the right is granted, the deferral of
the gain reportable by the borrower arguably should have no effect upon the deduction.
See Sections 163, 461. I.R.C. of 1954.
54 See Section 461(g), I.R.C. of 1954.
55 See Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); Commissioner v. Lobue, 351
U.S. 243 (1956).
16 See, e.g., McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954); Com-
missioner v. Estate of Stone, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954); see also the cases cited in
note 55 supra.
17 See the cases cited in note 55 supra.
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$100, and a current value of $1,000. The building was originally acquired
entirely with the proceeds of the $500 loan from L. The lender has a right
to fixed interest of 12% plus contingent interest equal to 50% of net profit,
including profit from dispositions. The loan documents provide that upon
conversion, L will receive a capital account equal to the unpaid balance of
the loan with a priority on liquidation, an annual return of 12% and a right
to 50% of sales proceeds after positive capital accounts of all partners and
the original capital of the partners are repaid.
If B is not a partnership, the transfer probably would be analyzed
as follows. L should be treated as exercising an option to acquire an undivided
interest in the property for an exercise price of $500, the unpaid balance of
the loan. L and B then contribute their undivided interests to a new part-
nership. 51 Under the normal rules L would not realize income as a conse-
quence of exercising the option even though the exercise price of $500 was
less than the value of what it received ($750). 59
B has transferred an undivided interest in the property in exchange
for $500. B should realize gain equal to the difference between the amount
realized and its basis in the transferred interest. 60 The gain should be derived
from the sale or exchange of the property so that the gain will be capital in
nature, subject to the usual rules. 63 The basis would be determined by the
percentage of undivided interest transferred by B. 62
If L realizes no income from the conversion (because L was
required to include the value of the right to convert in income when the right
to convert was granted), B presumably will not be required to realize any
income attributable to the $250 value of the property in excess of the loan.
Since the obligation to pay L contingent interest never accrued, B is not
satisfying any obligation by transferring appreciated property to L. Conse-
quently, there is no amount realized in excess of the $500 purchase price. In
this sense B should not be treated differently from any person selling appre-
ciated property pursuant to an option.
The new partnership's basis in the property will equal the sum
of L's basis plus B's remaining basis in its retained undivided interest. 63
If L is required to include the $250 of unrealized appreciation in
income when it exercises its right to convert (because the right had no as-
certainable value in the date it was granted), L's basis would be increased
58 See McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720, 725-26 (1964), acq. 1975-1 C.B.
2.
-9 See Palmer v. United States, 302 U.S. 63 (1931); Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-265,
1972-1 C.B. 222 (No gain is recognized when taxpayer exercises right to convert
bond into stock.)
60 Section 1022, I.R.C. of 1954.
61 Section 1201, I.R.C. of 1954.
62 See Rev. Rul. 67-309, 1967-2 C.B. 263. It is not simple, however, to determine
what percentage interest has been transferred. If the $500 purchase price is utilized,
then a 50% interest has been transferred, but if we use the $750 to which L would
have a right if the property were sold immediately, a 75% interest has been conveyed.
Obviously, it is to B's advantage to use the 75% figure since that means that the
amount realized, $500, will be offset by 75% of B's basis in the property.
6 See Section 723, I.R.C. of 1954. L's basis should include the basis of L in the
right to convert, which would equal the amount included in income when L received
the right.
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by $250, to $750. Since the tax consequences of the transaction are deferred
until conversion, B presumably would be deemed to transfer a capital interest
worth $750 to L, $250 of which should logically be viewed as additional
compensation for the. use of L's money, i.e., interest. B would be deemed
to transfer the $250 of value to satisfy an obligation to pay interest to L and,
accordingly, should be deemed to realize $750 as a result of the conversion.
If B is transferring $250 of value as interest, B should be entitled to a deduction
under Section 163. If the entire loan is not canceled as a result of the con-
version, and conversion occurs before the end of the loan term, the interest
arguably relates to future as well as past periods. Interest that relates to future
periods must be amortized over the loan term remaining after the conversion
occurs. 64 On the other hand, if upon conversion the loan term will expire,
the entire amount should be deductible.
As a consequence of L's increased basis, the basis of the new
partnership in the property should be increased by $250. 65
Thus far we have assumed that B is not a partnership. How would
the consequences differ if B were a partnership?
1. The Partners.
Under Sections 752 and 731 of the Internal Revenue Code,
the partners (X and Y) will each be deemed to receive a distribution equal
to their share of the released liability, or $250. Assuming for discussion
purposes that each has a basis in his interest of $50 on the date of conversion,
total gain recognized by the partners under these sections will be $400.
2. The Lender.
The consequences to L are less certain and depend upon
how one rationalizes the series of events occurring upon conversion. Arguably,
the transaction is a contribution of property by L in exchange for a partnership
interest. Section 721 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
contributing partner upon the contribution of property in exchange for a
partnership interest. On the assumption that cancellation of debt is a transfer
of property, it has generally been assumed that the cancellation is a contri-
bution to the capital of the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest
to which Section 721 applies. The rationale is that the intervening debt should
be ignored and the transaction should be analyzed as if the partnership interest
was received as consideration for a transfer of the property which originally
gave rise to the debt. 66 Thus, if the lender had contributed cash, instead of
making a loan, Section 721 would have applied. Consequently, Section 721
should apply to the cancellation of the debt in exchange for the partnership
interest. If Section 721 applies to the entire transaction, L would recognize
no gain upon the conversion.
In this case L receives a partnership interest worth more
than the $500 contribution of property. But the result arguably should be the
4Section 461(g), I.R.C. of 1954.
65 See Section 723, I.R.C. of 1954.
6See McKee supra note 27 at 4-11; Freeman supra note I at 956, N. 85; Rabinowitz
and Greenbaum, The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980: Partnership Considerations, 39
N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 41-1, 41-8 (1981).
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same as in the case of the exercise of an option by L to acquire the partnership
interest. In substance, L acquired a basis in its right to convert when it included
the value of the right in income. When L exercises the conversion right, it
is simply applying that property right towards the acquisition of a partnership
interest with a value in excess of L's basis in the property right. Under this
theory, L should be treated no differently from anyone else who acquires a
partnership interest in exchange for appreciated property.
This approach is consistent with the notion that the taxable
event with respect to the right to convert is the granting of the right.
But what if the taxable event for L is the exercise of the
right? In that case, does Section 721 override the general rule that a lender
must include interest in income, including interest paid in kind? It would
appear that L should be required to include the $250 as ordinary interest
income; presumably the acquisition of a partnership interest in consideration
of the use of borrowed money does not come within the ambit of Section
721.
Treasury Regulations under Section 721, however, may
create confusion. Treas. Reg. Section 1.721-1(b) provides that Section 721
shall not apply to the extent that a partner gives up his right to a return of
his original capital in order to satisfy an obligation. If the regulation is read
literally, there should be no gain recognized in our example; neither X nor
Y will suffer a reduction in its right to a return of capital based upon the
values as of the conversion date. Moreover, payment of the principal of the
debt was always senior to the right to a return of capital, so that the partners
give up nothing as a practical matter when L gets a capital account equal to
the unpaid balance of the debt.
If, as some suggest, an interest in unrealized appreciation
is viewed as a capital interest for purposes of the regulations, 67 X and Y are
transferring a share of their interest in capital that could be subject to the
regulation's exception to Section 721. If the conversion is the taxable event
for L, exercising the conversion right could be construed as the satisfaction
of the partnership's obligation to pay additional interest via a transfer of X's
and Y's right in unrealized capital value. If this is so, under this interpretation
of the regulations, L will recognize the $250 attributable to the value it receives
on the date of conversion. Of course, if the conversion is not the taxable
event for L there is no obligation satisfied by the conversion (except the debt)
and this section of the regulations would not render Section 721 inapplicable
to the conversion.
3. The Partnership.
As noted above, Section 721 might be deemed to apply tt
this transaction. If so, the partnership should recognize no gain from the
transaction. The partnership's basis in the assets whould remain unchanged,
as if L had contributed $500 for its partnership interest which was used to
repay the debt to L. This unfortunately results in subsequent recognition of
the full amount of the unrealized gain ($900) when the property is later
disposed of, even though X and Y have already recognized $400 of the gain
as a consequence of Sections 752 and 731. Although the additional $400 of
67 See McKee supra, note 27 at 5-6.
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gain would increase the basis of the partners to whom it is allocated and
thereby produce a capital loss when the partnership is liquidated, this may
create timing problems for the partners if the liquidation occurs in a different
year from the disposition of the property.
If Section 721 does not apply to the extent of the $250
premium, the partnership would probably be deemed to transfer an undivided
interest in its property worth $250 to L, who would be deemed to recontribute
the property to the partnership. 68 The partnership would recognize gain equal
to the difference between $250 and its basis in the transferred interest, and
it would have its basis in the property increased by $250 upon the recontri-
bution by L. 69 The partnership would also be entitled to a deduction for the
interest payment of $250. 70
It could be argued that the entire conversion transaction
should be viewed as if the partnership transferred an undivided interest in
property with a value sufficient to pay the debt to L and L contributed the
property to the partnership. This would make the tax consequences almost
identical to those resulting if the borrower is not a partnership. The amount
deemed transferred would of course depend upon whether the conversion is
the relevant taxable event for L. If not, the amount realized would be $500;
if conversion is the taxable event, the amount realized would be $750. The
partnership would realize gain that would be allocated to X and Y. Gain
attributable to the $250 premium could be offset by an interest deduction.
The gain allocated to X and Y would increase their bases so that the deemed
distribution under Section 752 should merely reduce their bases and not
produce additional gain. This construction of the transaction mitigates the
unfavorable timing consequences described above but may cause part of the
gain to be taxed as ordinary income to the extent of recapture. 71
If the conversion is not the taxable event for L, so that only
the $500 capital account attributable to loan principal is relevant for tax
purposes, the transaction would appear to come within the scope of Section
721 and there would appear to be no authority for restructuring the transaction
as a transfer of property for cash.
On the other hand if the conversion transaction is the taxable
event for L so that Section 721 doesn't apply, it is arguable that the transaction
need not be bifurcated into a Section 721 contribution of $500 and a transfer
of property for $250 of value to which Section 721 does not apply; the entire
transaction would more easily fit into the mold of a transfer of property by
the partnership to L.
0 See McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720, 725-26 (1964). The tax conse-
quences should be similar to those that apply to a transfer of a partnership interest for
services. For an illuminating discussion of this recondite area see McKee supra note
27 at 5-37. For a differing view of the same transaction, see Cowan, Substantial
Economic Effect - The Outer Limits for Partnership Allocations, 39 N.Y.U. Tax
Inst. 23-1 (1981).
69Section 723, I.R.C. of 1954.
70 Section 163, I.R.C. of 1954.
71 See Sections 1245, 1250, I.R.C. of 1954.
TAX CONFERENCE
VI. THE CONVERTIBLE PARTNERSHIP INTEREST (FORM #5)
This format is problematic on several accounts. First, the owner will
probably have an insufficient basis in its partnership interests to exploit the
additional losses allocable to the "common" partnership interests, unless a
portion of the lender's contribution is in the form of a loan. 72
Second, it would appear that the use of a preferred partnership interest
will not allow the owner of common interests to take the lion's share of the
losses unless the requirements of Section 704(b) are met. If only L is con-
tributing capital, L, and not the borrower, will be the partner that bears any
loss to the extent of the capital it has contributed in order to obtain its preferred
interest. Thus, the loss allocation to the borrower would be disallowed since
it would not have substantial economic effect. Only if the borrower is obligated
to make up any negative capital account will the borrower be the partner
bearing the economic loss corresponding to the tax loss. 71 The fact that L's
interest is "preferred" should have no effect on these rules. Consequently,
the borrower does not appear to be better off under this method than if L had
a 50% common interest to begin with. The losses could always be specially
allocated to the borrower if the borrower is willing to make up negative capital
accounts.
VII. THE GROUND LEASE FORMAT
The issues discussed with respect to the use of contingent interest
apply to this format as well. The goal of this form is to allow the borrower
to deduct the equity participation payments as rent pursuant to Section 162.
The basic question, once again, is whether the ground lessor (lender) becomes
a partner by virtue of sharing net profits with the lessee, and the same standards
would apply.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The tax consequences of the new financing devices described in this
article have yet to be addressed directly by the courts. Because the widespread
use of new lending practices is so recent, decisions that might provide guidance
are several years away. Until then, practitioners should be aware of the risks
and plan accordingly.
72 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
73 See McKee supra note 27 at 10-44 thru 10-46.
